Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement by Lucius Caviola et al.
SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE
published: 15 October 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00195
Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive
enhancement
Lucius Caviola1*, Adriano Mannino2, Julian Savulescu3,4 and Nadira Faulmüller1,4,5*
1 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
3 Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
4 Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
5 Department Values, Technology and Innovation, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
Edited by:
Mikhail Lebedev, Duke University,
USA
Reviewed by:
Peter B. Reiner, University of British
Columbia, Canada
Ioan Opris, Wake Forest
University, USA
Nick J. Davis, Swansea
University, UK
*Correspondence:
Lucius Caviola and Nadira
Faulmüller, Department of
Experimental Psychology,
University of Oxford, 9 South Parks
Road, Oxford, OX1 3UD, UK
e-mail: lucius.caviola@psy.ox.ac.uk;
nadira.faulmueller@psy.ox.ac.uk
Research into cognitive biases that impair human judgment has mostly been applied to
the area of economic decision-making. Ethical decision-making has been comparatively
neglected. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective
stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important
results. In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive
enhancement (CE) and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral
intuitions and judgments about CE: status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion, omission
bias, scope insensitivity, nature bias, and optimistic bias. We find that there are more
well-documented biases that are likely to cause irrational aversion to CE than biases in
the opposite direction. This suggests that common attitudes about CE are predominantly
negatively biased. Within this new perspective, we hope that subsequent research will
be able to elaborate this hypothesis and develop effective de-biasing techniques that
can help increase the rationality of the public CE debate and thus improve our ethical
decision-making.
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COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND BIASED REASONING
The enhancement of cognitive brain functions by means
of technology has become a reality. Recent research has
demonstrated that various pharmaceuticals can have—at least
modest—performance-enhancing effects in healthy individuals
(for reviews, see Repantis et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011).
In line with these findings, the off-label use of pharmacological
substances like methylphenidate (e.g., Ritalin-®) or modafinil
(e.g., Provigil-®) seems to be prevalent, in particular among
students (Herman-Stahl et al., 2007; Smith and Farah, 2011;
Dietz et al., 2013), and professionals in very responsible jobs like
physicians (Franke et al., 2013). It has even been argued that the
use of such substances might become an implicit requirement for
individuals in certain professions (e.g., Maslen et al., in press).
Non-pharmacological methods of cognitive enhancement (CE),
such as gene therapy or neural implants, could become more
widely used in the future (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). Even
though there is considerable use of CE, recent research shows
that the general public has strongly negative attitudes regarding
the introduction and use of CE (for a review, see Schelle et al.,
2014).
In this article, we argue that these concerns are partly driven by
pervasive cognitive biases. A bias is a systematic deviation from a
standard of rationality (Baron, 2005), an error frequently com-
mitted by the human mind. We use the definition of “rationality”
common in cognitive science, referring to normative models of
accurate belief formation (Foley, 1987; Audi, 2001) and optimal
decision-making in order to achieve one’s goal (Dawes, 1998).
(Ir)rationality is therefore relative to the goal of having accurate
beliefs or to goals in general. Thus, while some cognitive pat-
terns may be suboptimal with regard to a particular goal, they
may be perfectly optimal with regard to another. For illustra-
tion, consider “status quo bias”, which we will address in the
following section. If, upon reflection, an agent consciously and
stably places some intrinsic value on the status quo, then in
no sense can the agent be said to irrationally prefer the status
quo (i.e., to make a cognitive mistake in doing so). However,
the available evidence suggests that human agents do not, upon
reflection, intrinsically care about the status quo, or at least to a
significantly lesser degree than their immediate intuitions would
have it: the experiments documenting our intuitive status quo
preference (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) are inter-
esting because they reveal a fact about our intuitive decision-
making which our reflection disapproves of and is thus irrational.
Also, nearly all action-guiding moral theories have an account
of when the status quo should be modified, which is why the
general bias towards it will tend to bring about suboptimal
moral outcomes (c.f. Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Furthermore,
if by “moral” decision-making we mean decision-making that
is optimal from an “altruist” or “impartial” perspective, then
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non-related goals such as status quo preservation will lead to
irrationality, too. Hence, it is justifiable to classify the status quo
bias and the other biases we are discussing below as, indeed,
biases.
The aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on the debate
about CE by identifying cognitive biases that affect our common
intuitions and moral reactions. We will first give a rough overview
of the academic debate and the public’s view of CE and then
discuss a number of potential biases that are likely to influence
widespread judgments about CE.
In the academic debate about CE, opinions of critics (often
bioconservatives) and supporters (often transhumanists) are
quite sharply divided. Critics often question its medical safety,
considering the potential side effects and unknown long-term
health risks (Healey and Rayner, 2008). Critics also see CE as
a threat to human autonomy (Habermas, 2003), authenticity
(Elliott, 2004) humility and solidarity (Sandel, 2004) and equality
and fairness (Fukuyama, 2004). Proponents, on the other hand,
focus on the potential positive aspects and potentials of CE. For
instance, Savulescu (2006) points out that the introduction of CE
could help decrease unfair natural differences in abilities. Bostrom
(2008) emphasizes the enormous positive leverage effect that CE
could generate in the future. He speculates that a 1% increase in
all scientists’ cognitive performance “would amount to an indirect
contribution equal to 100,000 times what the average scientist
contributes” (p. 2). Others note that CE is not relevantly different
from traditional forms of enhancement, such as information
technology (Harris, 2010).
Recent research reviewing the general public’s attitudes
towards CE has shown that lay people share many of the crit-
ics’ concerns about CE (Schelle et al., 2014). Participants from
samples of students or parents, for example, fear that safety is
not ensured (Forlini and Racine, 2012; Partridge et al., 2013).
They think that CE could lead to peer pressure and thus under-
mine our autonomous decisions (Forlini and Racine, 2009). Also,
they worry that unequal distribution of CE would result in an
unfair advantage of a privileged few (Fitz et al., 2013). These
views are often reflected in exaggerated reports by the media
and might even lead to severe aversive social consequences for
users (Faulmüller et al., 2013). The Guardian, for example, has
described CE substances as “capitalism’s wonder-pills”, which
“turn you into the closest human approximation there is to a
machine” (Mahdawi, 2012).
We believe that the common concerns about CE are justified at
least to some extent, and a greater scientific understanding of CE
is required in order to draw confident conclusions (Maslen et al.,
2014). Most importantly, long-term safety of CE is not currently
ensured (c.f. Husain and Mehta, 2011) and is being called into
question (e.g., Urban and Gao, 2014). Nevertheless, we specu-
late that the public’s views on CE are negatively biased. While
the involved biases do not necessarily undermine any specific
argument for or against CE—these would need to be evaluated
on their philosophical and scientific merits—they might partially
explain the general opposition to CE as well as the selective focus
on certain arguments and exaggeration of their relative weight. It
is not unusual for human cognition to selectively search for cer-
tain classes of arguments and systematically neglect or undervalue
certain others (c.f. Kunda, 1990 on “motivated reasoning”)—
a bias that might affect the judgments of both opponents and
proponents of CE. Biases may lead people to come up with a set of
arguments that expresses sound considerations but is significantly
incomplete or weighted wrongly. We thus propose that in order to
fully explain prevalent opposition to CE, it is necessary to look
into the role biases play in the CE context. Awareness of these
biases is a precondition of rational public debate about CE, which
in turn is needed for developing and establishing optimal social
and legal regulations.
Empirical research into biases over the last four decades has
shown that human reasoning is very prone to systematic irra-
tional patterns, i.e., cognitive biases (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman,
1974), especially when the subject matter is as complex, novel,
abstract and ideologically loaded as is the use and regulation of
CE (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Kahan et al., 2013). We argue that
a number of cognitive biases well-documented in psychology and
behavioral economics partly explain prevalent negative attitudes
towards CE. While we believe that attitudes towards CE are
predominantly negatively biased, there may also be biases leading
us to irrationally favor CE. We will indicate some biases likely to
affect judgments about CE and illustrate why and how they may
be impairing our judgments in this context. Thus, our aim is to
suggest several hypotheses about potential irrational sources of
the prevalent (negative or positive) attitudes towards CE. Some
of the biases on our below list have been studied in behavioral
economics, such as status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion,
scope insensitivity. The others—omission bias, nature bias, and
optimistic bias—have been addressed more in psychology and
philosophy. Our application of the knowledge about biases to the
CE debate is comparatively novel, as is the application to ethical
issues in general. We hope to offer a valuable perspective as a
contribution to more rational public debate on controversial eth-
ical issues involving new practices or technologies. Since ethical
questions often involve high stakes, this endeavor can be expected
to yield important results for public ethical debate.
POTENTIAL COGNITIVE BIASES
STATUS QUO BIAS
Status quo bias describes the tendency to prefer the current state
of affairs over a change even if a change would result in better
expected outcomes. For instance, Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988) presented participants with hypothetical choice tasks
about financial investment, which either were defined with a clear
status quo or not. Participants were significantly more likely to
choose the option designated as the status quo compared to the
same option that was not labeled the status quo. Numerous fur-
ther experiments reliably demonstrate this effect (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1991). It seems plausible that popular aversion to CE is
partly due to status quo bias: it may partly result from the pure
fact that CE constitutes a novelty. Historically, new ideas and tech-
nologies have often encountered strong aversion and opposition
at first (Jay, 1981; Weil and Rosen, 1995), but became accepted at
a later point in time. Coffee—a traditional form of CE—provides
an instructive example: it was first considered an unacceptable
drug and even forbidden in some countries (Weinberg and Bealer,
2001; Cowan, 2005). Bostrom and Ord (2006) have already drawn
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attention to the role status quo bias likely plays in the debate
about CE. They also suggest a de-biasing tool—theReversal Test—
designed to expose and overcome status quo bias. If we believe
that the enhancement of certain cognitive abilities will have nega-
tive consequences, we should consider the reverse: if an increase in
intelligence is judged as negative, would a decrease in intelligence
be judged favorable? If not, we are committed to claiming that
our current level of intelligence is at an at least local optimum.
This is, of course, possible but would require further justification.
Obviously, it is an empirical question whether the introduction
of CE actually results in net positive consequences or not. In
case it would, however, status quo bias still exerts a psychological
force against its endorsement. Empirical research can potentially
expose the prevalence of status quo bias by, for example, observing
whether people come to a different conclusion after reflecting on
the rationale of the Reversal Test and applying it to the context of
CE.
LOSS AVERSION
Loss aversion describes the tendency to weigh losses more than
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). In monetary contexts,
for example, loss aversion results in a stronger dissatisfaction
after losing $1 than satisfaction after gaining $1 (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984). Whether something is perceived as a loss or as
a gain depends on how the decisional situation is framed: one
can either “get a $1 discount” or “avoid a $1 surcharge”. Loss
aversion can act on its own, but may also be a source of status
quo bias (Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Maybe we recognize positive
as well as negative consequences that the introduction of CE
likely entails, such as the potential benefits due to enhanced
intelligence on the one hand and the fear of increased unfairness
in society due to unequal access to CE on the other hand (Fitz
et al., 2013). But due to loss aversion, we likely tend to exaggerate
the weight of the negative consequences relative to the positive
ones.
RISK AVERSION
Risk aversion describes the tendency to undervalue an option
that is less certain compared to a more certain option with equal
expected outcome value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Since
preserving the status quo usually involves less uncertainty than
a change does, risk aversion may be a further source of status
quo bias, and it can act on its own as well. Consider a gamble
where you have the option A of winning $1000 with a chance
of 85% or the option B of winning $800 for sure. Most people
prefer option B to A. However, option A has a higher expected
value of 0.85 ∗ $1000 = $850 and is therefore the rational decision
if one values money linearly. As we are constantly faced with
uncertainty, we are in fact dealing with such gambles all the
time. We may be reluctant to introduce CE simply because its
expected consequences involve probabilities that deviate more
strongly from 100% and 0% than do the ones of the status quo.
For example, methylphenidate almost certainly improves memory
(for a meta-analysis, see Repantis et al., 2010), but there is a
chance of long-term adverse effects (King et al., 2006). Though the
expected utility calculation may favor the use of methylphenidate
in certain cases, people are likely to retain a preference against
it due to risk aversion and a resulting “precautionary principle”
heuristic.
OMISSION BIAS
Omission bias describes the tendency to judge decisions differ-
ently depending on whether the same outcome is brought about
through an act or an omission (Spranca et al., 1991). More specif-
ically, people consider harms that have been caused by action
worse than equal harms caused by omission. Ritov and Baron
(1990) observed that parents often show reluctance to vaccinate
their children. The expected harm of non-prevented disease is
much greater than the expected harm of vaccination (Gangarosa
et al., 1998), but parents seem to overvalue the expected harm
caused by the vaccination because it is the result of their action.
Similarly, we may fear that the introduction of CE is likely to
or may cause harm. However, CE may also prevent harms from
occurring and thus refraining from introducing may be a harmful
omission, i.e., a missed opportunity for reducing harm. Due to
our general omission bias, we are likely to systematically overvalue
the harm of introducing CE compared to the harm resulting
from not introducing it. For example, people might believe that
the use of CE substances by medical doctors potentially causes
active harm by inducing sleep disorders (Partridge et al., 2013)—
but they might neglect or underestimate the potential positive
consequences of doctors’ increased ability to focus, i.e., the poten-
tial negative consequences of inaction. Rejecting CE may lead
to greater harms suffered by more people overall. This question
cannot be settled by unreflective intuition but requires open—
un-biased—scientific investigation.
SCOPE INSENSITIVITY
Scope insensitivity occurs when people don’t assign appropriate
weight to the quantity of a decisional option (Kahneman, 2000;
Desvousges et al., 2010). For example, a study has demonstrated
that people are willing to pay the same amount of money to either
help 9,000 people or 90,000 people who are at risk (Kahneman
and Knetsch, 1992; Baron and Greene, 1996). This is irrational if
one’s goal is to help people and have everyone count the same, for
the money one is willing to pay should then scale linearly with the
number of people affected. It seems that our ability to intuitively
represent such large numbers and their relations correctly is
quite limited. In the context of CE, a probable implication is
that we are not giving appropriate weight to the enormously
high number of individual decisions, people (and generations)
potentially affected by the consequences of introducing CE and
thus to the importance and priority of the CE issue.
NATURE BIAS
Several studies on peoples’ attitudes towards CE have revealed
that natural CE substances are seen as less harmful and less
ethically problematic than artificial ones (e.g., Bergström and
Lynöe, 2008). For example, in a study with university students,
participants were more likely to consider the use of artificial CE
substances morally wrong than herbal ones (Scheske and Schnall,
2012). These judgments seem to be impaired by a form of nature
bias (c.f. the fallacy of appealing to nature), i.e., a tendency to
view the “natural” as good and the “unnatural” as bad. Given
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that many examples of “natural and bad” (e.g., diseases) as well
as “unnatural and good” (e.g., medicine) things exist, it is highly
questionable whether tracking the “natural” tracks what people
(would) actually assign value to, and it is clear that it is not intrin-
sically morally relevant according to the “altruistically/impartially
optimal decision-making” criterion.
OPTIMISTIC BIAS
Some biases may also be pushing people towards an overly
optimistic evaluation of the consequences of introducing CE. An
example is the optimistic bias described by Chapin and Coleman
(2009), which causes people to underestimate the possibility of
negative outcomes. Examples include people underestimating the
risk of becoming a victim of crime, of losing money in the
markets, or of getting lung cancer after smoking (Weinstein and
Klein, 1996). In the context of CE, people might underestimate
the dangers, such as negative side effects, that CE could entail.
An additional source of optimistically skewed views of CE
might result from biased reduction of cognitive dissonance by
people who are already using forms of CE. When confronted
with falsificatory information about CE, such as documented
health concerns, users might experience discomfort—cognitive
dissonance—and be likely to selectively adopt beliefs that justify
their behavior (Festinger, 1957).
Thus, there are potential biases leading to an overly positive
attitude towards CE. Overall, however, it seems there are more
well-documented highly prevalent biases likely to cause irrational
aversion to CE than biases in the opposite direction.
CONCLUSION
We have aimed to offer and motivate the perspective that biases
are likely to impair judgments about CE, mostly in the negative
direction. We are aware that the above list of biases is incomplete
and speculative and hope that empirical research will further
elaborate on our suggestions. It must be emphasized that “biases”
often do provide sensible decisional rules of thumb—after all,
many of them seem to have proven to be successful heuristics for
our evolutionary ancestors. However, the practical scope of this
argument is very limited first because our current environment is
different from our evolutionary environment, and second because
the metaphorical goals of our genes that have been served by some
“bias-heuristics” need not coincide with our goals (Stanovich,
2004). Nevertheless, the existence of such biases cannot alone
undermine the soundness of any objection to CE. But they can
explain why people, including policy makers, may take an unre-
flective or one-sided position on such debates. More generally,
many of our moral intuitions about controversial practices are
likely to be influenced by such cognitive biases. Not only do we
require psychological interventions such as remedial heuristics,
we require good ethical argument and relevant scientific evidence
to identify which of our moral intuitions are justified, and which
are not.
We believe the CE debate would benefit from research inves-
tigating the role cognitive biases play in judgments about CE
and from the subsequent development of techniques that help
people judge the relevant issues in a less biased way. These
techniques should be simple heuristics (Larrick, 2004) that are
easily applicable in the context of CE. Bostrom and Ord (2006)
Reversal Test or Savulescu (2007) Loss/Gain Heuristic are exam-
ples of such heuristics. Psychological research could test whether
people’s attitudes towards CE change after applying de-biasing
techniques, i.e., by being made aware of the biases potentially
impairing their judgments. If they do change, we have reason to
assume that cognitive biases play a role in the current attitudes
towards CE.
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